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Esotericism Ancient and Modern 
 Strauss Contra Straussianism on the Art of Political-Philosophical Writing 
Michael L. Frazer 
 
Abstract: Leo Strauss presents at least two distinct accounts of the idea that the authors in the 
political-philosophical canon have often masked their true teachings. A weaker account of 
esotericism, dependent on the contingent fact of persecution, is attributed to the moderns, while a 
stronger account, stemming from a necessary conflict between philosophy and society, is 
attributed to the ancients. Although most interpreters agree that Strauss here sides with the 
ancients, this view fails to consider the possibility that Strauss’s writings on esotericism may 
themselves be composed esoterically. A reevaluation of Straussian hermeneutics in light of this 
possibility suggests that the elitism and secrecy often associated with “Straussianism” may stem, 
not from Strauss’s true account of esotericism, but instead from an exoteric doctrine designed to 
seduce students into a life of philosophy. 
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“All I know is that I am not a Marxist.” 
  -Karl Marx
1 
 
Perhaps the only indisputably true statement that one can make about the thought of Leo 
Strauss is that there is remarkably little agreement on what Leo Strauss truly thought; Strauss has 
been described as everything from an apolitical scholar of the classics to the secret mastermind 
behind a cabal of neoconservative neoimperialists, as everything from a liberal democrat (or at 
least a “friend” of liberal democracy) to a “Jewish Nazi.”
2 This disagreement is understandable, 
for there can be few interpretive tasks more challenging than that of uncovering Strauss’s true 
teachings. Even if one is able to parse Strauss’s dense and enigmatic prose, one is still plagued 
by the fact that Strauss, far more often than not, availed himself of what he called “the immunity 
of the commentator.”
3 It is thus difficult, if not impossible, to separate Strauss’s doctrines from 
those he attributes to Plato and Xenophon, to Maimonides and Farabi, perhaps even to 
Machiavelli and Nietzsche.
4  
One of the few subjects which Strauss discusses in his own name, and not only as an 
interpreter of others, is the subject of interpretation itself. Central to Strauss’s writings on the 
proper interpretation of canonical political-philosophical texts is the phenomenon of esotericism, 
the idea that the authors of these texts have often masked their true teachings.
 5 Strauss’s writings 
on secret teachings, most famously the titular essay in Persecution and the Art of Writing, are 
thus commonly seen as possible keys to Strauss’s own secrets. Those who seize on these 
writings, however, usually fail to consider the possibility that the Straussian doctrine of 
esotericism as it is most commonly understood—the ancient doctrine that esoteric writing is the  
 
2 
only wise response to a necessary and eternal conflict between philosophy and society—may 
itself merely be exoteric. 
A successful reevaluation of Strauss’s writings on esotericism would thus prove 
invaluable to the evaluation both of Strauss’s own work and of the phenomenon known as 
“Straussianism.” My own attempt at such a re-evaluation will suggest that the ancient, 
inegalitarian account of esotericism most often associated with Straussianism may indeed not be 
Strauss’s true account, but instead an exoteric doctrine designed to seduce students into a life of 
philosophy.
6  Considering Strauss’s esoteric writings on esotericism in terms of their pedagogical 
function will pave the way for a richer understanding—not only of the controversies surrounding 
Strauss, his students, and the alleged cult that they have formed within the academy—but also of 
Strauss’s understanding of what he called the “sociology of philosophy” (PAW, p. 7), the nature 
of philosophy as a vocation and of its role in a polity, most pressingly in a liberal-democratic 
polity such as our own.   
*** 
We need not go so far, however, as to consider the possibility that Strauss never actually 
believed any of the great thinkers of the Western tradition wrote esoterically, that the practice of 
esotericism is for him an entirely exoteric myth. Most classic philosophical works are obviously 
composed such that only a careful reader, a reader who thus might accurately be described as 
willing to read “between the lines” (PAW, p. 24), will be able to grasp their full meaning. The 
only alternative is that these classics are simple books whose every nuance is accessible to all. In 
order to learn anything of significance from the trivial truth that philosophers often write 
esoterically, we must therefore provide a full account of this truth. As Stanley Rosen writes,  
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“The serious question is not whether philosophers practiced esotericism—every thoughtful 
human being does so to one degree or another—but why.”
7   
This question is central to Strauss’s hermeneutics; the reasons why philosophers write 
esoterically will shape how they write esoterically (to what degree they mask their true teachings, 
the stratagems they use to mask them, etc.), and thus in turn will shape how we can properly read 
their writings. The correct strategy for approaching esoteric texts, in other words, can only be 
determined through an account of the specific esoteric strategies used in their composition, 
which themselves can only be determined through an account of why these texts were written 
esoterically. 
Unfortunately, rather than one clear answer to the question of why philosophers practice 
esotericism, Strauss provides at least two answers. The first of these answers, an account based 
on the straightforward fact that many regimes actively persecute those who openly express 
heterodox beliefs, dominates the essay “Persecution and the Art of Writing.” In order to examine 
the “effect of that compulsion, or persecution, on thoughts as well as actions” (PAW, p. 22), 
Strauss here presents the “simple example” of a thinker (specifically, a “historian”) who wishes 
to express some truth under a totalitarian regime that has made the expression of this truth 
punishable by death (p. 24). Such a thinker surely cannot express the truth openly and 
unambiguously except in private communications with his closest and most trusted friends. He 
can, however, express the truth secretly and ambiguously in his published works, so that an 
underpaid and overworked censor will miss the secret teaching, but a careful student will 
understand and appreciate it. That is, the philosopher under a totalitarian regime—or, for that 
matter, in any society that persecutes heterodox thought—can choose to write esoterically. Such 
a literary technique “has all the advantages of private communication without having its greatest  
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disadvantage—that it reaches only the writer’s acquaintances. It has all the advantages of public 
communication without having its greatest disadvantage—capital punishment for the author” (p. 
25). 
This account of the need for esoteric writing allows us to draw certain conclusions about 
the manner in which we may read philosophical works with an eye to the possibility that they 
may contain a secret teaching. For one thing, according to Strauss, it allows us to form a certain 
rule about when we may justifiably dismiss a work’s obvious teaching as merely exoteric, and 
turn instead to finding an esoteric teaching written between the lines. “If it is true that there is a 
necessary correlation between persecution and writing between the lines,” Strauss writes, “then 
there is a necessary negative criterion: that the book in question must have been composed in an 
era of persecution, that is, at a time when some political or other orthodoxy was enforced by law 
or custom” (p. 32).  
Nowhere, however, has Strauss actually established a “necessary correlation between 
persecution and writing between the lines;” he has shown that persecution is a sufficient, but not 
a necessary, reason for the practice of esotericism, and there may still be other phenomena that 
also lead to this practice. Strauss himself presents such a possibility with a second account of the 
need for esotericism, an account which appears towards the end of the essay “Persecution and the 
Art of Writing,” and which dominates Strauss’s other writings on the subject. Rather than the 
contingent fact of persecution, this account relies on what is posited as an unchanging truth about 
the natures of political and philosophical life. As Strauss writes at the beginning of the essay “On 
a Forgotten Kind of Writing”: 
In studying certain earlier thinkers, I became aware of this way of conceiving the 
relation between the quest for truth (philosophy or science) and society:  
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Philosophy or science, the highest activity of man, is the attempt to replace 
opinion about “all things” by knowledge of “all things”; but opinion is the 
element of society; philosophy or science is thus the attempt to dissolve the 
element in which society breathes, and thus it endangers society.
8 
 
There is a critical difference between an esotericism arising from a necessary gap 
between society and philosophy and an esotericism arising only from the contingent fact of 
persecution. While the conflict between the philosopher and society which leads to the need for 
esoteric writing is “accidental” under the latter account, it is a “necessary conflict… if the 
element of society is necessarily opinion” (WPP, p. 229). Paul J. Bagley thus calls the mode of 
writing engendered by Strauss’s first account “conditional esotericism,” while the second 
account leads to “unconditional esotericism.”
9 Not only will the “negative criterion” discussed 
earlier fail to hold under the latter of these accounts of esotericism, but, since it demands esoteric 
writing “unconditionally”—or, more properly, as a response to conditions which hold necessarily 
and at all times—no such negative criterion may be established under this account at all.
10 The 
wise will always recognize the eternal conflict between political opinion and philosophical truth, 
and will thus choose to express difficult truths esoterically, “even if they… [have] nothing to fear 
from any political quarter” (PAW, p. 34). The wise living in a “liberal” era will write esoterically, 
not out of fear, but out of respect for the need for political society and the opinions which are 
necessarily the “element” of such a society. Indeed, insofar as they understand the distinctive 
natures of philosophy and politics, the wise in a liberal society, who are absolutely free to refute 
society’s opinions, will question “the wisdom of such extreme liberalism” (WPP, p. 224). They 
will thus write esoterically, not because of the wrongful and misguided actions of the regime 
under which they live, but despite them.  
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 Strauss presents the conflict between these two accounts of the need for, and hence 
character of, esotericism, like most other conflicts that he discusses, as a conflict between the 
ancients (a category which, for Strauss, includes all pre-Enlightenment thinkers, including 
medievals) and the moderns. The “unconditional” account of esotericism takes its inspiration 
from Plato’s Seventh Letter, and finds its clearest expression among non-Christian Medievals 
such as Maimonides and Farabi,
11 while the “conditional” account had a number of 
Enlightenment-era exponents,
12 so Strauss’s treatment of the debates over esotericism as yet 
another round in the great querelle des anciens et des modernes seems reasonable.  
Such a presentation affords us greater insight into the two accounts, making it evident 
that they are indeed in conflict, that they cannot merely supplement each other as two separate 
but mutually compatible causes of the same phenomenon. The moderns hold to the persecution 
model because, according to the Enlightenment tradition, “suppression of free inquiry is 
accidental, an outcome of the faulty construction of the body politic” (PAW, p. 33). Philosophers 
who wish to practice their art freely should then make it their goal to “enlighten” their cities, to 
work to correct the flaws in regimes that have made cities hostile to the truth. This implies that 
society can indeed be built around the truth, a truth which the majority may not be able to 
embrace with the certain knowledge of philosophers, but which it can at least accept on their 
authority in the form of “true opinions.” Esotericism can be a powerful tool for creating such a 
truth-based society, for it will undermine the false doctrines of the day, while nonetheless 
allowing the philosopher to live to see tomorrow. This will be an esotericism of a particular kind, 
however, a particularly weak esotericism. The moderns have almost invariably “concealed their 
views only far enough to protect themselves as well as possible from persecution; had they been  
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more subtle than that, they would have defeated their purpose, which was to enlighten an ever-
increasing number of people who were not potential philosophers” (PAW, p. 34).  
Strauss’s ancients, on the other hand, understood the reasons for esotericism to be 
necessary and virtually eternal. The conflict between philosophy and politics is a result of an 
essential “gulf separating ‘the wise’ and ‘the vulgar’ … a basic fact of human nature which could 
not be influenced by any progress of popular education” (PAW, p. 34). A society for the mass of 
humanity cannot be built on the truth because the mass of humanity will reject the truth. Nor is 
their rejection unreasonable, for the truth will invariably be harmful except for a select few, the 
philosophers and the potential philosophers. Esotericism is thus the means for communicating 
truths dangerous to the multitude within the philosophical community, a community of 
unacquainted individuals living in different places and at different times but united through their 
secret communication. This stronger esotericism will produce texts far more inscrutable than 
esoteric texts in the modern mode. Rather than a tool for the enlightenment of all, esotericism 
here serves as a test, a test for admission into a secret (counter-)society. 
A possible Straussian methodology for reading esoteric texts would seem to follow from 
this distinction. Ancient texts may be read as strongly esoteric works, while modern texts may be 
read as weakly esoteric works when written under a non-liberal regime, and must not be read 
between the lines at all when written under a liberal regime. The problem with such a 
methodology is that it assumes philosophers are captive to the ideas of their time and place, the 
very sort of historicist thinking which Strauss (at least exoterically) opposes so adamantly in so 
many of his writings. The truly wise will break free from the opinions of both the masses and of 
the intellectual elite of their day, and come to embrace the truth as it really is. Since a student of 
Strauss is interested in reading esoteric texts written by the truly wise, we cannot develop a  
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Straussian hermeneutic for these works until we have established which of the two accounts is 
(according to Strauss) the true account. 
*** 
Some of Strauss’s writings on the subject of esotericism, however, may tempt us to reject 
any real dichotomy between the ancient and modern accounts of esotericism, and to maintain 
that Strauss’s true teaching must somehow be a synthesis or a reconciliation of these two views. 
Indeed, in one of Strauss’s earliest discussions of the subject of esotericism, which comes at the 
end of a 1939 essay on Xenophon’s Constitution of the Lacedemonians, there is as yet no 
distinction between ancient and modern accounts of esotericism.
13 Having witnessed the 
execution of their friend Socrates, Xenophon and Plato were well aware (as were Herodotus and 
Thucydides before them) that philosophical impiety was at their time “subject to persecution;” 
esoteric writing allowed them to avoid Socrates’ fate. Such writing’s “disappearance was 
simultaneous with the disappearance of persecution, just as its reappearance is simultaneous with 
the reappearance of persecution.”  
Yet Strauss insists that it would “betray too low a view of the philosophic writers of the 
past if one assumed they concealed their thoughts merely for fear of persecution.” Instead, they 
also kept their true teachings hidden out of the conviction that the truth is forever unsuited for the 
vulgar. Under this account, esoteric writing is a necessity recognized “in all epochs in which 
philosophy was understood in its full and challenging meaning, in all epochs, that is, in which 
wisdom was not separated from moderation.” The disappearance of esoteric writing is now 
observed to have occurred, not only with the disappearance of persecution, but also to have 
“almost” coincided “with the victory of higher criticism and of systems of philosophy which 
claimed to be sincere but which certainly lacked moderation.”   
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Rather than a harmonization of the ancient and modern accounts of esotericism, however, 
this early discussion of the subject by Strauss is rather clearly a presentation of the ancient 
account. There is nothing in the ancient account of the phenomenon which precludes the 
possibility of esotericism designed to avoid persecution; Strauss reports that Farabi—one of the 
great exponents of esotericism in the strong, ancient mode—acknowledges that persecution is 
indeed a sufficient reason for practicing esotericism, albeit “the most obvious and crudest 
reason” for doing so (PAW, p. 17). As long as it is recognized that there are also reasons for 
practicing esotericism grounded in a permanent gap between philosophy and society, reasons 
which hold even when persecution ends, an account of esotericism qualifies as unconditional. It 
is thus clear that the two accounts of esotericism can never really be reconciled; either there are 
necessary sufficient for this practice grounded in the unchanging natures of society and 
philosophy or there are not, and the mere mention of persecution does not render an account of 
esotericism conditional or “modern” if these eternal reasons are acknowledged as binding. The 
fact that the disappearance of persecution “almost” coincided with the disappearance of 
philosophical moderation—that is, with the loss of the knowledge of the “unconditional” reasons 
for practicing esotericism—admittedly allows for the appearance of ambiguity in Strauss’s 1939 
discussion of this subject. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that Xenophon’s esotericism was 
primarily motivated by consideration of the natures of society and philosophy; the contingent 
fact of persecution can be said to have left his choice over-determined, but its absence would not 
have altered his esotericism.  
This should come as no surprise from an ancient author, but what is striking here is that 
Strauss is not merely providing the ancient account of esotericism in his role as an interpreter of 
Xenophon, but also appears to be endorsing this ancient doctrine in his own name, holding it to  
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follow necessarily from a “full” understanding of philosophy and the practice of the virtue of 
“moderation.” Those, such as Shadia Drury, who wish to attribute the ancient account of 
esotericism to Strauss have seized on Strauss’s 1939 essay as the text in which he most “clearly” 
states the doctrine “that esotericism is not just an attempt to escape persecution, but a duty, 
because the vulgar are unfit for the truth.”
14 Similar, if somewhat more ambiguous, statements 
which appear to endorse the ancient account of esotericism are to be found scattered throughout 
Strauss’s writings on the subject.
15 Indeed, if “Straussianism” is understood as a largely 
uncritical return to ancient political philosophy, it would follow that Strauss would side with the 
ancients on the subject of esotericism, as he would on all other such matters.
16 The view of 
Strauss as advocating the ancient account of esotericism over the modern may thus be accurately 
described as the conventional interpretation of his doctrine on esotericism. Indeed, both the 
exponents and the opponents of “Straussian” esotericism have tended to identify this practice 
with ancient, unconditional esotericism, rather than with the modern, conditional esotericism 
which Strauss also describes.
17 
*** 
It is critical to note, however, that under both the ancient and the modern account of 
esotericism, Strauss himself ought to be writing esoterically. The ancient account, of course, 
would make esotericism as much an intelligible necessity for Strauss in his day as it was for 
Plato or Maimonides in theirs. Even under the modern model, however, the political conditions 
of the United States in the mid-twentieth century were not so free as to allow for a complete 
abandonment of esoteric modes of expression. The persecution that is the precondition for 
esoteric writing under this account “covers a wide variety of phenomena, ranging from the most 
cruel type, as exemplified by the Spanish Inquisition, to the mildest, which is social ostracism”  
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(PAW, p. 32). It is for this reason that, under the modern model, esoteric writing may be needed 
even in “comparatively liberal periods,” even in times and places with such hallmarks of 
liberalism as complete religious freedom, for “religious persecution and persecution of free 
inquiry are not identical” (PAW, p. 33). Recall also that this persecution may be the result of 
either law or custom. “Social ostracism” may thus be the fate of those who openly and publicly 
express heterodox views even in nations where an absolute right to freedom of speech is 
guaranteed by law. This is not to say that there are not eras of “extreme liberalism” in certain 
countries when esotericism becomes entirely unnecessary. When pressed for examples of such 
societies “in which men can attack in writings accessible to all both the established social or 
political order and the beliefs on which it is based,” however, Strauss offers “the third Republic 
in France and post-Bismarckian Wilhelmian Germany” (WPP, p. 224). He notably excludes the 
United States of the twentieth-century. 
This exclusion is eminently sensible in light of the historical circumstances. The essay 
“Persecution and the Art of Writing” was, after all, the work of a German-Jewish refugee first 
published less than a month before the United States entered World War II. Even the most just 
war is a time of censorship and the devaluation of free expression, albeit as a necessary sacrifice 
to protect freedom itself from grave dangers, dangers that Strauss himself alludes to in the 
opening lines of his essay. Even after the war, however, freedom of expression was far from 
fully actualized in the American republic. In “On a Forgotten Kind of Writing,” first published in 
1954, Strauss praises a man who understands that there are “contemporary dangers to intellectual 
freedom… caused, not only by men like Senator McCarthy, but by the absurd dogmatism of 
certain academic ‘liberals’ or ‘scientific’ social scientists as well” (WPP, p. 223). While the  
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esotericism required under the modern model by such “mild” persecution might not be especially 
strong, it is esotericism nonetheless.  
Though we are as yet unsure whether to apply the modern or the ancient model to 
Strauss’s own use of esotericism, we can thus be certain that, to one degree or another, his works 
are indeed esoterically written.  This is far from an original discovery; many of the most 
insightful commentators on Strauss in recent years, among both Strauss’s admirers and his 
critics, have begun from the premise that Strauss’s works mask a hidden teaching. Indeed, 
Strauss is today often remembered not merely as a political philosopher in the sense of a theorist 
of political things, but also as a politic philosopher, a philosopher who was a master of the art of 
esoteric speech and writing.
18 It is thus no surprise that a careful commentator would begin by 
observing that for Strauss the philosophical practice of esotericism is the essence of “political” 
philosophy, as Strauss observed it was for Farabi (PAW, p.  18). 
Most such commentators adhere to the conventional view that Strauss is an adherent to 
the ancient account of esotericism, and thus that he must be writing in a strongly esoteric 
manner.
19 The Strauss that emerges from such an analysis is often a sort of secret Nietzsche, an 
immoralist and inegalitarian for whom the Platonic philosopher-king is an exoteric stand-in for 
the Overman, and the return to ancient natural right a stand-in for the will to power. The one 
critical difference between Strauss and Nietzsche, however, is that while Nietzsche screamed out 
his terrible truths in bold German prose, Strauss hid his away amid drawn-out scholarly exegeses 
on the traditional canon. In other words, Strauss is held to be esotericist in the ancient mold, 
while Nietzsche holds the modern view; living in Wilhelmian Germany, and under no great 
threat of persecution, Nietzsche saw no need to practice esotericism.
20 Laurence Lampert thus  
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attacks Strauss in Nietzsche’s name, insisting that Strauss shows an insufferable “lack of 
boldness on behalf of philosophy at a decisive moment in its history.”
21  
The more liberal Shadia Drury also criticizes Strauss for adhering to the ancient mode of 
esotericism, not for the lack of boldness it shows, but for the extreme inegalitarianism it 
presupposes, inegalitarianism in some ways more profound than even Nietzsche’s. Drury sees 
this account of esotericism to imply that “the gap between the vulgar and the wise is so great” 
that “there is one rule for citizens and another rule for the wise and powerful.”
22 We must reject 
Strauss, because in embracing the ancient account of esotericism, he rejects the validity of a 
single morality for all of humanity. Of course, Strauss foresaw that most of his modern readers 
would be morally outraged by his teachings on esotericism, especially if these teachings are 
understood as advocating the ancient, stronger version of esotericism. “Every decent modern 
reader,” he wrote, “is bound to be shocked by the mere suggestion that a great man may have 
deliberately deceived the large majority of his readers” (PAW, p. 35). Such is Drury’s shock, and 
while Nietzscheans such as Lampert may be less “decent” than Drury, they still can find 
sufficient cause to object to Strauss’s supposed ancient esotericism. 
The majority of Strauss’s commentators, however, regardless of whether they are 
admirers or critics, fail to follow their line of argument to its logical conclusion. If Strauss’s 
teaching on all other matters is merely exoterically Platonic or ancient while esoterically 
Nietzschean or modern, we must also consider the possibility that his teaching on esotericism 
itself is merely exoterically ancient while esoterically modern. No teaching of Strauss’s deserves 
to be exempted from critical scrutiny; upon such scrutiny, any one of these teachings, even 
Strauss’s  teaching on esotericism itself, may reveal itself to be an exoteric mask hiding a deeper, 
esoteric truth.
 23 We must thus consider the possibility that Bagley is correct when he writes, in a  
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footnote to his 1992 essay, “If Strauss is guilty of anything, it is that he wrote esoterically about 
esotericism.’”
24 Unfortunately, Bagley, who is more concerned with making skeptical anti-
Straussians take esotericism seriously than with interpreting Strauss’s position on the subject, 
fails to develop this observation any further. 
 Of all of the commentators on Strauss of whom I am aware, Stanley Rosen comes closest 
to Bagley’s position. “Strauss’s revelation of esoteric teachings, with respect to the ‘early’ or 
pre-Enlightenment philosophers,” he writes, “was itself exoteric.” By this, however, Rosen does 
not mean that Strauss’s teaching on esotericism might be merely exoteric. Rather, Rosen implies 
that in his commentaries on the ancient authors Strauss’s implication that he understands these 
author’s secret teachings might be an exoteric falsehood, because Strauss very possibly “did not 
know the original teaching.” Rosen concludes that this possibility “makes no difference” because 
“in order to understand Strauss himself, we need to start from his own practice of esotericism,” 
that is, his practice of esotericism in the strong, ancient mode.
25 Though he is willing to 
undermine the conventional understanding of nearly all that Strauss wrote, Rosen is thus 
unwilling to undermine the conventional understanding of Strauss’s writings on esotericism. 
*** 
It is thus necessary to make one’s own attempt to read between the lines of Strauss’s 
doctrine of reading between the lines. A good way to start might be by applying Strauss’s 
methodology for reading esoteric texts to Strauss’s own writings on esotericism. Yet practicing 
Straussian hermeneutics is always fraught with difficulties. For Strauss, as Paul Cantor has 
noted, “interpretation cannot hope to proceed according to universal and unequivocal rules, 
which will always yield unambiguous and unassailable results… One can offer principles of 
interpretation, but not rules, unless one means rules in the sense of rules of thumb.”
26  It is for  
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this reason that Strauss granted his detractors their argument that “the method of reading which I 
suggest can never lead to absolute certainty.” Strauss, however, then asks rhetorically, “Do the 
alternative methods of reading lead to absolute certainty?” (WPP, p. 231).
27 Yet if applying this 
method to any esoteric text is a difficult task with uncertain results, then applying them to 
Strauss’s own esoteric texts on esotericism will be doubly difficult, and yield results twice as 
uncertain. 
“One of Strauss’s rules of thumb for interpreting esoteric texts,” Cantor writes, “is to pay 
close attention to what goes on at or near the middle of a work, and to discount what is said at the 
beginning or the end.”
28 This rule of thumb is little help to us here, however. “Persecution and 
the Art of Writing” may begin with the modern model, but it introduces the ancient model not in 
the middle section of the essay (which is devoted to the nature of reading between the lines, a 
discussion presumably valid under both models) but in the final section. Other essays, such as 
“On a Forgotten Kind of Writing,” are devoted entirely to the ancient model, beginning, middle 
and end. 
Strauss also insists that, in reading an esoteric text, one pay special attention to 
conditional and qualified language. “Cannot miracles be wrought by such little words as 
‘almost,’ ‘perhaps,’ and ‘seemingly’?” he asks. “May not a statement assume a different shade of 
meaning by being cast in the form of a conditional sentence? And is it not possible to hide the 
conditional nature of such a sentence by turning it into a very long sentence…?” (PAW, p.  78). 
Sure enough, conditionals are to be found throughout Strauss’s discussions of ancient, 
unconditional esotericism, especially when Strauss presents the eternal conflict between the 
philosopher and the city. “There is a necessary conflict between philosophy and politics if the 
element of society necessarily is opinion,” Strauss writes on one occasion (WPP, p. 229, italics  
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added). Might this suggest that, despite the conventional view to the contrary, Strauss may 
indeed be an advocate of the modern view of esotericism? Perhaps, but his discussion of the 
modern view in “Persecution and the Art of Writing” is also filled with conditional and qualified 
sentences. When introducing the “negative criterion” discussed earlier, recall that Strauss said 
such a criterion holds only “if it is true that there is a necessary correlation between persecution 
and writing between the lines” (PAW, p. 32, italics added).   
 We surely cannot exclude from our analysis the most (in)famous of Strauss’s rules of 
thumb for reading between the lines. “Secrecy is to a certain extent identical with rarity,” Strauss 
reasons in his essay on Maimonides’s esoteric techniques. “What all people say all the time is the 
opposite of a secret. We may therefore establish the rule that of two contradictory statements in 
the Guide or in any other work of Maimonides that statement which occurs least frequently, or 
even which occurs only once, was considered by him to be true” (PAW, p. 73).  Again, this 
principle of interpretation is of little use in our situation, for while the modern model is discussed 
with great frequency in “Persecution and the Art of Writing,” the ancient model is discussed 
more frequently in Strauss’s other writings on esotericism. One should also note that it is the 
ancient model that is presented most frequently in Strauss’s commentaries,
29 but this can be 
explained as a result of the fact that Strauss’s commentaries are most often on pre-modern 
thinkers who advocated the unconditional model of esotericism. Discussions of their ancient 
views might then be understood as merely reflecting these views, and thus would not enter into 
an investigation of Strauss’s own position. 
On the other hand, this conclusion may be inappropriate when considering an esoterically 
written commentary.  Farabi, after all, “avails himself… of the specific immunity of the 
commentator or of the historian in order to speak his mind concerning grave matters in his  
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‘historical’ works rather than in the works in which he speaks in his own name” (PAW, p. 14).
30 
So are we then to conclude that, since Strauss most often defends the ancient account of 
esotericism in his commentaries, while defending the modern account in his own name, the 
ancient account is his true account? Or are we to conclude that, since both his commentaries and 
the works in his own name are to be treated as containing Strauss’s true teachings, the ancient 
account is the more frequently defended account while the modern account is less frequently 
defended, and thus that the modern account is Strauss’s true account? There is, quite simply, no 
way to tell. 
Even more troublingly, it may have been a mistake to turn to Strauss’s interpretive 
methodology in the first place, for we must be open to the possibility that this methodology is 
itself exoteric, or at least an inappropriate tool for uncovering Strauss’s true teaching on 
esotericism. Indeed, it seems that most of these rules of thumb for reading between the lines were 
developed by Strauss for reading pre-Enlightenment works written in the strong, ancient esoteric 
manner. While these techniques may perhaps be valid for the reading of such works, to apply 
them to Strauss means to assume that he too wrote in the ancient esoteric manner, and thus that 
he was a believer in the unconditional account of esotericism. That is, in our attempt to call the 
conventional understanding of Strauss’s teaching on esotericism into question, we have been 
perversely assuming the validity of that very interpretation.  
We are caught in a double bind, for any possibly valid reading of a text by Strauss must 
legitimate its interpretive principles in the thought of Strauss himself; to do otherwise is to 
assume that the interpreter can understand Strauss better than he understood himself, the tell-tale 
hubris of a historicist. As soon as one attempts to ground one’s interpretive principles in some 
particular statement by Strauss, however, one is groundlessly assuming that this statement  
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reflects Strauss’s true beliefs, that it is not just another noble lie. This problem becomes all the 
more acute when the Straussian texts one is attempting to interpret are the very same texts in 
which one is attempting to ground one’s allegedly Straussian interpretive principles, that is, those 
texts on the reading of esoterically written texts. 
*** 
Yet if any text of Strauss’s is an unreliable hermeneutic guide because its teachings might 
be merely exoteric, perhaps we can turn, not to Strauss’s words, but to his deeds.
31 Presenting 
exoteric falsehoods in their speeches and writings in order to hide dangerous truths can only be 
of benefit to philosophers. Living according to those falsehoods, however, can only serve to 
harm them, depriving them of the excellence attainable only through a life in accordance with a 
true understanding of the world and our place within it. Strauss’s relevant actions here are 
twofold: First, Strauss chose the life of a teacher and a scholar. Second, as a scholar, Strauss built 
his reputation, not only through the insight of his commentaries and the loyalty of his students, 
but as the re-discoverer of “a forgotten kind of writing.”  
By writing on the subject of esotericism, a subject that had been neglected for centuries, 
as well as by interpreting the classics of political philosophy in light of their esoteric nature, 
Strauss made at least some of the secrets of the philosophers available to all. Though his writings 
are never easy or clear, they surely unmask the secrets of the classics to some degree. Yet there is 
only one passage in his published works in which Strauss directly attempts to justify his 
disregard for the esotericist intentions of the authors he is interpreting. Like many of Strauss’s 
most important passages dealing with the issue of esotericism, it is a passage on Maimonides—
the fourth of six sections of the essay on “The Literary Character of the Guide for the 
Perplexed,” a section entitled “A Moral Dilemma.” Strauss here writes that “no historian who  
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has a sense of decency and therefore a sense of respect for a superior man such as Maimonides 
will disregard light-heartedly the latter’s entreaty not to explain the secret teaching of the Guide” 
(PAW, p.  55). How, then, does Strauss justify his revelation of these secrets?  
Strauss’s justification is twofold. First, Strauss writes that “the historical situation in 
which we find ourselves is fundamentally different from that of the twelfth century.” In a 
passage quoted at length by Rosen, and well worth quoting at length yet again, Strauss goes on to 
explain: 
Public opinion was then ruled by the belief in… the existence of an eternal and 
unchangeable law, whereas public opinion today is ruled by historic 
consciousness. Maimonides himself justified his transgression of the Talmudic 
injunction against writing on the esoteric teaching of the Bible by the necessity of 
saving the law. In the same way, we may justify our disregard of Maimonides’ 
entreaty not to explain the Guide by appealing to the requirements of historic 
research… The force of this argument will become even stronger if we take into 
consideration the basic condition of historic research, namely, freedom of 
thought. Freedom of thought… seems to be incomplete as long as we recognize 
the validity of any prohibition to explain any teaching whatsoever. Freedom of 
thought being menaced in our time more than for several centuries, we have not 
only the right but even the duty to explain the teaching of Maimonides, in order to 
contribute to a better understanding of what freedom of thought means, i.e., what 
attitude it presupposes and what sacrifices it requires (PAW, pp. 55-56). 
This passage does not merely present a change in historical situation; it presents a change 
in fundamental values, with Strauss defending his revelation of Maimonides’ secret teachings in  
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terms of the values of his day as Maimonides defended his revelation of the Bible’s secret 
teachings in terms of the values of his. Such a justification implies that Strauss has himself 
embraced the modern values of historic consciousness and freedom of thought; unless one is to 
embrace historicism, one must acknowledge the freedom of authors to accept or reject the values 
that dominate their eras. In other words, as Rosen writes, “If this statement were taken as a frank 
assertion of Strauss’s own views, we would have to conclude that he accepted the contemporary 
liberal principle of unreserved freedom of speech and hence that he was, as it were, an 
Enlightenment philosopher.”
32 For our purposes, this means that if the passage in question were 
not merely exoteric, it would imply Strauss is an advocate of the modern account of esotericism. 
In typical Straussian fashion, however, this passage is immediately followed by a contradictory 
argument justifying Strauss’s actions, an argument compatible only with the ancient view of 
esotericism. 
 Maimonides, himself an advocate of the ancient view of esotericism, felt that he could 
save the Bible and its law by communicating its secret teaching, not to all, but to the few 
philosophically-minded souls capable of understanding and appreciating this secret teaching. To 
do so, he wrote an esoteric commentary on the teachings of the Bible, itself an esoteric work. If 
he were to follow Maimonides’ model, Strauss reasons, the interpreter of the Guide would thus 
write his commentary in “the form of an esoteric interpretation of an esoteric interpretation of an 
esoteric teaching.” While Strauss admits, “this suggestion sounds paradoxical or even 
ridiculous,” he concludes, “an esoteric interpretation of the Guide seems to be not only 
advisable, but even necessary” (PAW, p. 56). Clearly, this contradicts the earlier claim that “we 
have not only the right but even the duty to explain the teaching of Maimonides” in a manner 
that advances the cause of freedom of thought. So which is the true teaching and which the  
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merely exoteric? We could conceivably attempt to re-apply the Straussian methodology for 
reading esoterically written texts to this apparently contradictory passage, but such a procedure 
has been demonstrated to be both practically useless and theoretically unsound. Instead, we must 
turn to the evidence provided by Strauss’s deeds. Did Strauss reveal the secret teaching of the 
Guide in a manner so as to advance the cause of freedom of thought for all, or did he only 
esoterically hint at this teaching in a manner of benefit only to the philosophical few? 
In fact, Strauss did neither of these things. As Rosen correctly points out, “Despite 
Strauss’s extensive discussions in various places of Maimonides’ intentions and methods, he 
never did reveal ‘the secret par excellence of the Guide.’”
33 Rosen would like to attribute this 
either to the fact that Strauss’s claim to know Maimonides’ secret teaching was a merely exoteric 
claim, or that Maimonides himself falsely claimed to be masking a secret teaching within the 
Guide. Nonetheless, Rosen acknowledges the possibility that he has simply been unable to find 
the secret because Strauss has hidden it so well. In this case, “Strauss could hardly be practicing 
either the concealment or the revelation characteristic of the Enlightenment,” with it understood 
by Rosen that Strauss would then be practicing the ancient form of esotericism.
34 What Rosen 
fails to consider, however, is that Strauss’s treatment of Maimonides’ secrets may represent a 
break from both the ancient and Enlightenment modes of esotericism. 
 Indeed, rather than revealing Maimonides’ secrets to all or hiding them away from all 
but a very few, Strauss provides his readers with a method for reading Maimonides which, with 
the proper effort, should yield up any secrets that the rabbi might be hiding. The methodological 
nature of most of Strauss’s work on Maimonides is evident from the very titles of all but his 
earliest writings on the sage—titles such as “The Literary Character of the Guide…” “How to 
Begin to Study the Guide…” “How to Begin to Study Medieval Philosophy,” and so on. The  
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methodology that these essays describe is neither hidden nor obscure, but available to any 
beginner with sufficient interest and patience to put difficult and demanding techniques of 
interpretation to work on a classic text. Insofar as its presentation is such that Strauss’s 
methodological teaching is accessible to all, it is entirely incompatible with the ancient view of 
esotericism. Yet insofar as Strauss presents methods which few will be willing to go through the 
effort of carrying out rather than doctrines which will enlighten all, he is also not acting in a 
manner consistent with the modern account of the matter. 
As for Strauss’s commentaries on other esoteric writers, while they might not be as 
uniformly methodological as his commentaries on Maimonides, they all have a similar effect of 
forcing Strauss’s readers to return to the classic texts themselves. Nowhere are secrets presented 
in a manner suitable for acceptance by the masses, for serving as “true opinions” from which an 
enlightened society can be built. Instead, the student of Strauss, whoever he or she may be, is 
compelled to become a student of the philosophical masters that Strauss analyzes.
35 Upon 
returning to the masters after reading Strauss, however, Strauss’s students are equipped with a 
host of new insights and new hermeneutic techniques. Strauss’s goal thus seems neither to be for 
the philosophers to enlighten all of humanity by reshaping society, nor for the philosophers to 
forever hide their secret teachings from all but a chosen few. Instead, he seems to be inviting 
anyone who is willing to make the effort to become one of the philosophers.  
That Strauss’s true view on esotericism would not fit neatly into either the ancient or the 
modern models of the phenomenon was to be expected. While we had good reason to be dubious 
of the conventional interpretation of Strauss’s teaching as identical with the ancient account of 
esotericism, there are also insurmountable problems with positing Strauss’s teaching as identical 
with the modern, Enlightenment account of esotericism. Such a correspondence between  
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Strauss’s true account of esotericism and the modern account would mean that all those passages 
that have convinced most interpreters that Strauss is in fact an advocate of the ancient account 
would be merely exoteric. Furthermore, this exoteric advocacy of the ancient account of 
esotericism must be meant in some way to protect Strauss from some form of persecution, for 
(provided again that the modern, conditional account of esotericism is the true account) there can 
be no reason to write esoterically except to avoid such persecution. Admittedly, if Strauss were 
indeed the secret Nietzsche many of his interpreters have claimed him to be, it would still follow 
from this modern esoteric model that he should discuss many of his true philosophical and 
political beliefs esoterically. After all, as is well known, anything but whole-hearted commitment 
to liberal democracy in its battles with fascism and communism could have disastrous results for 
a public figure in mid-twentieth century America.  
Yet while this may explain Strauss’s use of esoteric techniques in his discussions of, for 
example, ancient natural right, it cannot explain his use of esoteric techniques in his discussions 
of esotericism. More specifically, it cannot explain why he would want the vulgar reader to 
believe he was advocating the ancient, stronger account of esotericism rather than the modern, 
weaker account. It would seem that the modern account of esotericism would be more amenable 
to most mid-twentieth century Americans than the ancient account, especially to the coterie of 
“academic ‘liberals’ or ‘scientific’ social scientists” who had the power to practice “social 
ostracism” within the American academic community.
36 Indeed, it would seem that an exoteric 
appearance of support for the ancient model of esotericism could lead, as Rosen notes, only to 
“almost unmitigated ridicule, not to say persecution, at least in the English-speaking academy.”
37 
***  
 
24 
We must thus introduce a new account of esotericism that is compatible with Strauss’s 
deeds, if not always his words. To do so, let us turn to Strauss’s most fundamental of real-life 
decisions, his choice to lead the life of a scholar, teacher and (despite his repeated assertions that 
he is unworthy of the designation) philosopher. This choice of life must mean that, at least for 
those who are capable of it, the philosophical life is indeed a good life, perhaps even the good 
life. The second best life may then be one devoted to the study of the work left by these true 
philosophers, scholarship undertaken in the hope that, with sufficient intellectual struggle, one 
may someday prove worthy of joining their ranks.  Strauss’s writings defending this position—
his often hyperbolic odes to the philosophical vocation—cannot be entirely exoteric.  Since such 
sentiments are reflected in Strauss’s deeds as well as his words, we are safe in assuming they 
reflect at most an exaggeration of his true position on the subject. Strauss writes that, in a world 
of suffering: 
We have no comfort other than that inherent in this activity [of philosophy]… It 
leads us to realize that all evils are in a sense necessary if there is to be 
understanding. It enables us to accept all evils which befall us and which may 
well break our hearts in the spirit of good citizens of the city of God. By 
becoming aware of the dignity of the mind, we realize the true ground of the 
dignity of man and therewith the goodness of the world… which is the home of 
man because it is the home of the human mind (LAM, p. 8).  
Even if Strauss truly believes that the philosophical way of life is the best way of life, he 
also insists that philosophers are still always “in grave danger,” albeit not necessarily from 
persecution. Instead, each is in danger of being the last of their kind, of witnessing the extinction 
of philosophers as such. This is because, while the philosophical life once actualized is one of  
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great joy, the years of effort necessary to attain this sort of life are invariably difficult and 
unpleasant. “The movement from the untruth to the truth is not simply a movement from 
unrelieved darkness and terror to pure light and joys,” Strauss writes. “On the contrary, the truth 
appears at first to be repulsive and depressing” (LAM, p. 83). Most potential philosophers (a 
group which could conceivably include anything from a very small elite or the whole of 
humanity) will thus be driven away from the philosophical life before they can experience its 
joys. The danger that none will chose even to begin such a difficult journey is especially acute in 
today’s society, a society in which “mass culture” distracts us from our quotidian miseries 
“without any intellectual and moral effort whatsoever and at a very low monetary price” (LAM, 
p. 5). Under Strauss’s account, those who are distracted by mass culture are neither hostile to nor 
in favor of the philosophical life, but view it with a sort of indifference. They cannot understand 
why potential philosophers would deprive themselves of readily available pleasures on a quixotic 
quest for truth, and they are merely repulsed by their fleeting encounters with philosophy. Thus, 
in order to insure that the tradition of philosophical living can be preserved for future 
generations, Strauss concludes that “a special effort is needed to counteract the first appearance 
of the truth” (LAM, p. 83).  
In his “Notes on Lucretius,” Strauss suggests that this “special effort” ought to be in the 
form of poetry (LAM p. 83). Although Lucretius used actual verse, esoteric prose seems an even 
better “poetic” form for gradually acclimating potential philosophers to the truth. Rather than 
bombard initiates with teachings that they will only find “repulsive and depressing,” esotericism 
provides a method for slowly luring them to search for “those hidden treasures which disclose 
themselves only after very long, never easy, but always pleasant work” (PAW, p. 37). Esoteric 
communication, moreover, has the pedagogic advantage of forcing students to think for  
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themselves, to consider whether a philosopher’s reasoning at any given time is sound and reveals 
his true teaching or is merely exoteric. In this way, students may almost be said to discover the 
truth through their own reasoning—that is, almost to be practicing genuine philosophy.
38 We can 
call this new account of esotericism the “educational” or “pedagogical” account, and it seems to 
be the best candidate for Strauss’s true teaching on the subject. 
Is the educational account of esotericism, however, truly distinct from the ancient and 
modern accounts of the phenomenon? After all, any communication of truths is ipso facto 
educational; a concern for the education of others by the writer must be presupposed in both the 
ancient and modern accounts of esotericism. Fearing persecution, or believing that the 
dissemination of certain teachings is inherently harmful to society, the philosopher could easily 
remain silent. A decision to communicate, to write esoterically in either the ancient or the 
modern mode, can only be attributed to a desire to educate “the puppies of his race” (PAW, p. 
36), that is, potential philosophers. Indeed, Strauss presents the educational purpose of 
esotericism at the end of “Persecution and the Art of Writing,” not as a new and different account 
of the phenomenon, but as an essential element of both of the two accounts he has already 
presented;
39 this is also how the educational purpose of esotericism has been described by most 
of Strauss’s interpreters.
40  
Strauss even characterizes the difference between the ancient and modern forms of 
esotericism as a difference in the belief as to whom this education ought to be directed, a 
difference in what is believed “about popular education and its limits” (PAW, p. 33). According 
to the ancients, only a very small minority, a tiny elite of potential philosophers, can benefit from 
an education through esoteric writing. According to the moderns, however, even if not all can 
become philosophers, all can benefit from a philosophical education. Strauss might plausibly be  
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said to take a middle position between the ancients and the moderns on this question. To be sure, 
we will never have the resources to offer a full liberal education to all; Strauss insists that “we 
must not expect liberal education can ever become universal education. It will always remain the 
obligation and the privilege of a minority” (LAM, p. 24). Yet Strauss clearly imagines that this 
minority will extend beyond the even smaller elite of potential philosophers; it also includes a 
considerable number of non-philosophical “gentlemen.” And while Strauss would admit that 
once philosophical education is made available to more than a very tiny few, most of those who 
receive this education will never move beyond philosophical scholarship to genuine 
philosophy—most will never graduate from studying the thought of others to producing original 
thought of their own—he would still insist that the life of students and scholars who do not 
themselves qualify as philosophers is both inherently valuable and a necessary to maintain the 
philosophical way of life as a possibility for others. A broad community of philosophically-
literate non-philosophers, Strauss would argue, is needed both to preserve the insights of past 
philosophers and to establish an atmosphere of free enquiry so that new philosophers can be 
expected to emerge in the future.
41 
Yet while a concern for education may be essential for esoteric writers both ancient and 
modern, one would be consistent in rejecting both the ancient and modern models of esotericism 
and still writing esoterically out of a concern for education. Those concerned exclusively with 
the educational uses of esotericism might be willing to adopt exoteric masks which actually lead 
to greater persecution (thus violating the modern model) and greater harm to society and its 
opinions (thus violating the ancient model) than would result if they openly taught the secrets 
that they have hidden for purely pedagogical purposes. Indeed, the exoteric masks that educators 
adopt might actually be less orthodox than the rather commonplace truths that they are masking,  
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secrets that don’t really qualify as secret. It would seem that Strauss’s exoteric advocacy of the 
ancient model of esotericism is exactly such an educational use of the art of esotericism, one 
which is incompatible with both the modern and the ancient accounts of the phenomenon. 
Appearing to adhere to the ancient, inegalitarian account of esotericism can only serve to draw 
the wrath of decent liberals, and may even do real harm to our liberal democratic society, but it 
might be an effective solution to a central problem in philosophical pedagogy.  
Strauss’s problem is straightforward but immensely difficult: he must lure students away 
from mass culture and lead them down the long road to the philosophical way of life. He must do 
so, not only out of love for his students, but to insure that the possibility of a philosophical way 
of life is available to future generations. Most problematically, he must lure young men and 
women, not only from mass culture as instantiated in popular entertainment, but also from mass 
culture as instantiated in the fashionable non-philosophy of “certain academic ‘liberals’ or 
‘scientific’ social scientists.” As David Lewis Schaefer has observed, Strauss’s academic 
competitors could easily “recruit followers by espousing partisan political causes in their classes 
or by flattering students’ prejudices in favor of ‘idealism’ or ‘compassion.’” In this way, “the 
academy becomes the servant rather than the critic of unreflective passions.”
42  Strauss, too, must 
appeal to his student’s passions in order to recruit them as philosophers, but he must so shape 
these passions that they will compel the students to do what the passions would otherwise 
oppose, to begin the long and difficult journey to wisdom. Strauss must thus play the part of the 
seducer, and exoteric allegiance to the ancient model of esotericism may play a critical role in 
this process of seduction. 
First, the possibility of a treasure-hunt through the classics of the philosophical canon, the 
chance to search for secrets where once there were only dry doctrines, is, as Lampert says, “so  
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entertaining in its intricacies, so intoxicating in its audacity”
43 that it can make difficult study of 
philosophical texts feel like a grand game. Only after the game is over, only after the puppies 
grow into philosophers, will Strauss’s students even consider the possibility that they have been 
duped, that Strauss’s treasure map was exoteric, a ruse designed only to draw them into 
philosophy. By this time, however, they will have come to experience the happiness of 
philosophizing, and could only thank Strauss for his benevolent pedagogical deceptions.  
Second, Strauss’s exoteric adoption of the ancient model of esotericism, through its 
insistence on an unbridgeable divide between the wise and the vulgar, seduces students into a life 
of philosophy by appealing directly to their vanity, a vice which so often characterizes the 
young. Strauss’s students come to believe that, through a combination of their own natural gifts 
and their great good fortune to be blessed with a true philosopher as a teacher, they can enter the 
ranks of an ancient philosophical brotherhood. In this way, as Drury writes, “Strauss seduces 
young men into thinking that they belong to a special and privileged class of individuals that 
transcend ordinary humanity and the rules applicable to other people.”
44 Such elitism infuriates 
liberal egalitarians, thus exposing Strauss and his followers to a great risk of at least some form 
of persecution, be it ever so mild as social ostracism within the academy. Furthermore, the 
existence of a class of philosophically inclined (though not yet philosophical) pseudo-Supermen 
cannot serve to benefit our liberal democratic society. In this way, Strauss’s exoteric use of the 
ancient model of esotericism can be justified under neither the ancient nor the modern models of 
esotericism, but only by the educational model.  
*** 
If anything, Strauss might have been too successful in his use of esotericism for 
pedagogical purposes. He has regularly been accused of seducing a mass of his students, plus  
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their students and their students in turn, not into adopting the philosophical way of life, or even a 
life of legitimate philosophical scholarship, but into adopting something known as 
“Straussianism,” “a quasi-religious ‘faith’ in which [Strauss’s] followers ‘believe’ less as 
students than as ‘disciples.’”
45 The Straussian cult is seen as embracing Strauss’s teachings in the 
manner in which the masses accept the philosophical truth under the modern model of 
esotericism, not as knowledge, but as true opinion accepted on authority. “It is ironic,” Drury 
writes, “that the ‘young men who love to think’ and who are destined to become the heirs of 
Strauss are characterized by their willingness to accept Strauss’s authority without question.”
46 
What Drury fails to consider is the possibility that Strauss may have agreed with her 
assessment that the creation of such a cult is an evil, albeit an evil necessary for the preservation 
of the philosophical way of life.
47 As his puppies grow into full-fledged philosophers, it would 
be Strauss’s hope that they abandon the dogmatism of their youth, a dogmatism that was 
necessary only in the early stages of their philosophical education.
48 If many of them do not, and 
remain forever mired in a cultish “Straussianism,” then the flourishing of this cult must be 
understood as a negative externality from the production of non-dogmatic scholars and, in certain 
fortunate instances, genuine philosophers. In light of such a possibility, it seems that Strauss may 
have intended that his zetetic teachings be so ironically dogmatized, that he may have used the 
phenomenon of dogmatic Straussianism for his own pedagogical purposes.  
Perhaps a better metaphor for the phenomenon of Straussianism than that of a “faith” or a 
“cult” is thus that of Freemasonry. In Lessing’s dialogue “Ernst and Falk,” discussed in Strauss’s 
posthumously published essay on “Exoteric Teaching,” the practitioner of esotericism is 
identified wit the member of such a fraternity; a “Freemason” is defined, in Strauss’s paraphrase, 
as a man who “must know truths which ought better be concealed.”
49 If they believe that they are  
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the philosophical elect of the ancient model of esotericism, Straussians are in this sense 
Freemasons. Like the literal Freemasons, they are attracted to the secretive society for the sense 
of superiority it gives them and for the mystic truths it promises to reveal eventually.
50 Yet it is 
often the case with Freemasonry that, unlike the lesser masons, the master mason knows that 
Freemasons are in no way superior to others, and that there are no mystic truths to be revealed. 
He understands that the brotherhood exists solely for the sake of fostering an international 
community devoted to virtue, but understands that such an international community holds little 
attraction in itself. The secrecy and rituals that give initiates a sense of superiority, as well as a 
hope to learn some mystic truth, are a necessary means of recruiting members for the club, a club 
which itself exists only as a means of actualizing higher goods.
51 Strauss may have been a master 
mason of this type, the leader of a fraternity whose true purpose was hidden by an exoteric mask 
of secrecy and superiority. If we accept that his apparent advocacy of alternately the modern and 
then the ancient accounts of esotericism is merely exoteric, and that Strauss’s true belief is that 
the primary purpose of esotericism is educational, such Freemasonry would be one of the most 
powerful pedagogical tools at his disposal. 
As the Anti-Masons of the nineteenth century argued so vehemently, however, it is 
inherently dangerous to a democratic polity to have elitist secret societies wielding any 
considerable degree of social or political power, even when this power is allegedly wielded only 
for the most enlightened of ends. And although the most extreme allegations about the political 
power of the Straussian “cult” are best dismissed along with all other such conspiracy theories, 
the very existence of Freemasonic “Straussianism” raises legitimate moral and political concerns. 
To be sure, if Strauss’s hyperbolic praise of philosophy is to be taken literally—if philosophy is 
indeed the only thing of value in the world—then the possibility of this way of life must be  
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preserved by any means necessary. This would suggest a roughly Nietzschean picture of ethics 
and politics, one in which all human individuals and institutions are to be used as mere means for 
the production of humanity’s highest specimens, the few creative individuals whose 
achievements justify existence as a whole. Yet it seems more likely that, while philosophers and 
their work are of very great value indeed, there are also other values in ethics and politics with 
which this value must compete. The propagation of the philosophical way of life thus may not be 
worth the danger posed to our liberal democracy by the persistent power of an elitist 
Freemasonic order. Indeed, we may wonder whether philosophy might survive perfectly well 
without the artificial inducements provided by Freemasonic membership. Is the initial 
appearance of truth actually as ugly as Strauss maintained it to be, or might gaining knowledge 
be sufficiently appealing in itself to lure potential philosophers without added, artificial 
inducements?
52  
In its insistence that students must be seduced to philosophy even if this seduction poses 
real dangers to the polity, the educational model of esotericism lacks the characteristic 
conservative virtues of the ancient model, the sense of political responsibility which seeks to 
protect the existing order from the forces which could destroy it. At the same time, it also lacks 
the characteristic liberal virtues of the modern model: its fundamental egalitarianism and its 
emphasis on the widespread propagation of truth. To be sure, the educational model need not 
embrace the natural divide between the philosophers and the multitude assumed by the ancient 
model, but the natural superiority of a wise elite has here been replaced by the artificial 
superiority of an educated elite, an elite which has been provided with philosophical training and 
successfully seduced to a life of scholarship or philosophy while their fellows have not. Like the 
hierarchy of Plato’s kallipolis, moreover, this hierarchy depends upon lies of only questionable  
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nobility—lies here directed, not to the multitude to justify their subjugation, but to the elite to 
justify their superiority. Rather than telling the masses that they are mere iron, Strauss’s exoteric 
embrace of the ancient model of esotericism leaves his followers believing that they are golden. 
This myth of natural hierarchy is meant to seduce students to a life spent in the pursuit of truth, 
but it is legitimate to ask whether in the promotion of such a lifestyle we may justifiably violate 
the spirit of intellectual honesty central to the practice of philosophy itself.   
Yet before we are too quick to condemn Strauss’s pedagogical practice as unnecessary, 
morally repugnant or politically irresponsible—a practice which dishonors the very form of life 
it is meant to promote—we must remember that this account of esotericism may not actually be 
Strauss’s own. This essay’s interpretation of Strauss as writing esoterically on the subject of 
esotericism for educational purposes must necessarily remain a tentative one. The interpretation 
of esoteric texts is hardly a precise science resulting in certain knowledge; as Strauss himself 
observes, “reading between the lines will not lead to complete agreement among scholars” 
(PAW, p. 30). But this essay has come to its conclusions without ever accepting that any work of 
or passage by Strauss necessarily reflects his true teaching, acknowledging the possibility that 
any doctrine which one might glean from a text by Strauss may be entirely exoteric, including 
Strauss’s teachings on esotericism itself. Regardless of whether he would agree with our 
conclusions, it is difficult to imagine Strauss taking issue with this zetetic method. Skepticism, 
he repeatedly insists, is the essence of philosophy, and it is this insistence which forever 
prevented Strauss from becoming a dogmatic Straussian. “As long as there is no wisdom but 
only the quest for wisdom,” Strauss writes, “the evidence of all solutions is necessarily smaller 
than the evidence of the problems. Therefore the philosopher ceases to be a philosopher at the  
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moment at which the ‘subjective certainty’ of a solution becomes stronger than his awareness of 
the problematic character of that solution. At that moment the sectarian is born.”
53   
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